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AFTER "LIFE FOR ERIE"-A REPLY 
Peter Westen* 
Erie, having "preoccupied the intellectually dominant group of 
academic lawyers rising to maturity during the 1940's and 1950's,"1 
is reported to be losing its "symbolic centrality"2 for the newest gen-
eration of legal scholars. Professor Redish's prompt and excited re-
sponse to our essay proves one thing: there is at least one scholar in 
the country who, having come to legal maturity during the last dec-
ade, still remains capable of becoming impassioned about Erie RR 
v. Tompkins. 
I. 
Although Erie may have "ceased to be the Pole Star'' of contem-
porary legal scholarship, it "will remain a star of the first magnitude 
in the legal universe"3 because it addresses two ever-present and 
profound questions in American political theory: (1) What is the re-
lationship, or mix, between federal law and state law in the courts of 
the United States? (2) Who decides what that relationship shall be -
the federal legislature or the federal courts? 
(1) 
As for the first question, it is fair to say that the relationship be-
tween federal law and state law is whatever Congress desires it to be. 
This should come as no surprise: it follows from the recognition that 
there are very few meaningful constitutional restraints on the asser-
tion of congressional power vis-a-vis states, and that the few re-
straints which do exist are not generally enforced in the courts.4 The 
same is true, too, of congressional assertions of power in diversity 
suits. Realistically, Congress is not likely to enact a rule of law for 
diversity suits that is so in excess of its enumerated powers, and so 
intrusive upon the "reserved" powers of the states, that the federal 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Harvard University; J.D. 1968, 
University of California, Berkeley. - Ed. 
l. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 272 n.4 (1977). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS ch. 
4 (1980). 
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courts would deem the statute invalid; if Congress did enact such a 
statute, it would mean that perceptions of federal power vis-a-vis the 
states and perceptions of diversity litigation had so changed, that "all 
bets" would be "off."5 
To say that Congress may displace state law whenever Congress 
so desires means that for the-federal government as a whole, the va-
lidity of federal rules of decision is not realistically at issue. For the 
federal government as a whole, the real question is not whether it 
has constitutional power to enact federal rules of decision in diver-
sity and nondiversity suits, but whether it has legislative intent to do 
so; not whether a federal rule of decision is capable of displacing 
state law, but whether it purports to do so; not whether a federal rule 
of decision is valid as applied, but whether it is pertinent to the issue 
in dispute. 
To say that state law must yield to federal law whenever the fed-
eral government as a whole desires it, however, does not tell us when 
that is. " 'Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's' does 
not tell us what things are Caesar's."6 In order to decide whether to 
displace state law in the federal courts-that is, to decide between 
adopting an "independent"7 federal rule of decision and adopting a 
federal rule that incorporates state law by reference8-the federal 
government must weigh three variables: (a) the value in prescribing 
any rule at all for the dispute, as opposed to allowing the dispute to 
be resolved by private standards;9 (b) the value in creating an in-
dependent federal rule of decision, as opposed to using pre-existing 
and already operative state rules; 10 and (c) the value in maintaining 
5. Compare J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 182-83 (1980). 
6. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 
55 YALE L.J. 267, 280 (1946). 
7. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947). 
8. This process can be described in different ways. One can say that the task is to deter-
mine whether there is an independent federal rule of decision and, if not, to determine further 
whether to adopt state law by reference or dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Westen & Lehman, 
Is There Life far Erie Ajier the .Death of .Diversil)'?, 78 MICH, L. REV, 311, 356-59 (1980), 
Alternatively, one can assume that the federal court has jurisdiction and, hence, say that the 
only issue is whether to apply an independent federal rule of decision or a federal rule that 
incorporates state law by reference. See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 
(1979); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For most purposes, these 
are logically equivalent ways of stating the same thing. The only reason it may make a differ-
ence is that the latter formulation assumes that the federal court has jurisdiction to apply some 
rule of decision, while the former reserves the variable of jurisdiction for separate assessment. 
9. For an example of such abstention, see Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
l 0. This variable applies only to secondary rules, viz., rules that the national government is 
free to make or not make. The variable does not exist with respect to primary rules that pre-
scribe an independent federal rule of decision as a matter of fundamental law. See, e.g., U.S. 
CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . • . abridging the freedom of speech"), 
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a federal forum to hear the dispute, as opposed to leaving its resolu-
tion to the state courts. 11 None of the variables can be ascertained 
without reference to the others: one cannot decide whether to adopt 
a federal rule as opposed to a state rule without also considering 
whether there ought to be any rule at all; one cannot decide whether 
or not to adopt any rule at all for a dispute without considering 
whether the federal courts will have jurisdiction to hear the dispute; 
one cannot decide whether the federal courts ought to assert jurisdic-
tion without considering what rule of law they will be applying. 
These are the issues that make Erie important and enduring. 
They underlie every proposed assertion of federal authority, and 
they operate as well in the adjudication of diversity suits as in other 
assertions of federal jurisdiction. 
(2) 
The second of the great Erie questions follows from the first. As 
we have seen, the federal government as a whole has authority to 
displace state law practically whenever it so desires, based on its as-
sessment of the variable considerations set forth above. Since the 
federal government as a whole is free to draw the line between fed-
eral law and state law to be applied in the federal courts, the search 
for legal limits must tum elsewhere. Since the federal government as 
a whole has nearly plenary authority to choose, the significant ques-
tion is, which branch of the government has authority to make such 
choices for the federal government as a whole? Since there are so 
few limits on what is decided, the real limits, if any, must be on who 
decides. -
The limits derive from. the way in which lawmaking competence 
is allocated among the three branches of the federal government. If 
the three branches each had concurrent and equal competence to 
make law (if that were even conceivable), none would be limited in 
defining the relationship between federal law and state law in the 
federal courts. However, since their competences are not the same, 
the allocation of competence creates limits on the authority of one 
branch to make law for another. Thus, the judicial branch has final 
authority to establish constitutional law ( or, more accurately, to es-
tablish what it says is constitutional law), just as the legislative 
branch has final authority to make nonconstitutional law for the fed-
eral government. If the legislature enacts rules in conflict with con-
11. This variable does not apply to the few forms of mandatory federal jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors ... the Supreme 
Court shall have original Jurisdiction"). 
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stitutional law as announced by the courts, the rules lack authority; if 
the courts announce rules of statutory interpretation or rules of com-
mon law that are in conflict with enactments of the legislature, their 
rules, too, lack authority. The defect in the latter case is not that the 
federal government as a whole lacks authority to enact the rule, but 
that the federal courts have no authority to speak for the federal gov-
ernment. The issue is not what the federal government as a whole 
desires to do, but what each branch is allowed to do. The issue is not 
the pertinence of the federal rule - the issue is its validity. 
The immediate issues in Erie itself were issues of validity. The 
issues were two-fold- one involving the validity of an act of Con-
gress, the other involving the validity of a judge-made rule of rail-
road liability. The Rules of Decision Act had come to be understood 
to be a delegation by Congress to the federal courts to create federal 
general common law in diversity cases; 12 the Court in Erie invali-
dated the Act, so construed, because the Act conflicted with prevail-
ing constitutional law as announced by the courts - law to the effect 
that the federal government has no general lawmaking power. 13 At 
the same time, the lower courts in Erie had created a special federal 
common-law rule of railroad liability applicable in diversity cases; 
the Court in Erie also invalidated this special judge-made rule - not 
because it exceeded the constitutional authority of the federal gov-
ernment as a whole - but presumably because it was a judge-made 
rule of nonconstitutional law that conflicted with prevailing noncon-
stitutional law as announced by the legislature.14 The defect in each 
case was not that the respective rules were not intended to govern the 
issue in dispute, but that they had been enacted by branches of gov-
ernment with no authority to promulgate them. 
Needless to say, while the analysis of validity can be illustrated 
by reference to Erie, it is not confined to diversity suits. It is poten-
tially present in every assertion of federal authority, and it is present 
12. The Erie Court also concluded that this understanding of legislative intent was false, 
' and that Congress had not intended the Rules of Decision Act to be a delegation of general 
/ federal common-law power. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938). But since the 
courts had followed the erroneous construction (and Congress, by its silence, had implicitly 
ratified it) for over a hundred years, the Court concluded that it was not free to repudiate it 
simply on statutory grounds. 304 U.S. at 77-78 ("If only a question of statutory construction 
were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout 
nearly a century."). 
13. 304 U.S. at 78 ("There is no federal general common law."). See Friendly, In Praise of 
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 384-98 (1964). 
14. See Friendly, supra note 13, at 397 n.66; Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-
The Thread, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1684 n.10 (1974). 
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in diversity adjudication to no greater degree than in other assertions 
of federal jurisdiction. 
In the last analysis, validity and pertinence are mutually reinf orc-
ing. Determinations of pertinence are influenced by issues of valid-
ity, because in determining what they want to do, the branches of 
government are affected by what they believe they are allowed to 
do. 15 Conversely, issues of validity may shade into determinations 
of pertinence - not because the two issues are conceptually indis-
tinct - but because of institutional deference by the courts to the 
legislature and because of institutional inertia in the legislature 
against the enactment of legislation. Thus, although the federal 
courts could rather frequently strike down congressional legislation 
as an unconstitutional intrusion upon powers reserved to the states, 16 
they rarely do so; and, hence, they leave it to Congress to displace 
state law whenever Congress thinks best. By the same token, al-
though Congress could nearly always repudiate nonconstitutional 
judge-made law by enacting superseding legislation, it tends to defer 
to the courts; and hence, Congress also leaves it to the courts to strike 
whatever balance between federal law and state law they deem 
best. 17 The consequence is that standards of validity are rarely en-
forced. In practice, if not in theory, each branch of government -
like the federal government as a whole - exercises discretion to do 
what it believes to be desirable. 
IL 
The most significant thing about Professor Redish's response to 
our essay is that he disagrees with very little of it. He implicitly 
agrees with Jeffrey Lehman and me that diversity problems are a 
part of a larger inquiry into the relationship between federal law and 
state law in the federal courts. He apparently agrees with the axioms 
of federalism we set forth in Part I, including our description of the 
nature of the national government, the relationship of the national 
government to the constituent states, the competency of the respec-
tive branches of the national government, and the continuum that 
15. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 344. 
16. If anyone doubts this, consider the behavior of the Court in the period 1895-1937. 
17. Indeed, when Congress eventually turns its hand to enacting legislation in areas of 
nonconstitutional law already developed by the courts, it often merely codifies the federal 
common law as previously (and tentatively) developed by the Courts. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 2, 
1966, 80 Stat. 1105, now 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1977), by which Congress amended the federal 
habeas corpus statute to codify in statutory form certain rules of nonconstitutional law that the 
Supreme Court had fashioned in the meantime in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). See 
White v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp. 42, 60 (W.D. Mo. 1966). 
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exists in judge-made law between federal statutory interpretation on 
the one hand and federal common law on the other. He also seems 
to agree with our application of the axioms in Part III to a selection 
of nondiversity problems. 
Professor Redish focuses his attention on Part II, where we ap-
plied the axioms in rather painstaking detail to diversity suits -
both in order to illuminate our approach to diversity problems and 
to lay a foundation for our later discussion of nondiversity problems. 
Even there, the area of his own previous work, Professor Redish 
finds little to disagree with. He implicitly agrees with our analysis of 
constitutional rules in diversity suits, including our suggestion that 
Byrd was wrongly decided. He also silently agrees with our analysis 
of statutory rules in diversity cases, and with our treatment of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. In short, his disagreement is limited 
to one area alone - the sphere of judge-made rules in diversity 
cases. 
Professor Redish's criticisms are essentially two-fold: (1) He dis-
putes the content of the federal policy that limits (or ought to limit) 
the federal courts in fashioning judge-made rules in diversity cases. 
He denies that the policy is designed to protect individual litigants 
from discrimination in the outcome of litigation based on their 
places of citizenship, and argues, instead, that it is designed to pro-
tect state governments from the displacement of their law. (2) He 
also disputes the source of the foregoing policy. He denies that the 
policy itself is judge-made, and argues, instead, that it derives from 
the Rules of Decision Act. 
We are disappointed in Professor Redish's response, because we 
hoped to persuade him; but we are not surprised, because he is re-
peating the same things he said three years ago. We disagreed with 
him then, and continue to disagree now, for essentially the same rea-
son: by focusing only on diversity cases and, within diversity cases, 
only on judge-made rules, he takes too narrow a view of the relation-
ship between federal law and state law in the federal courts. When 
one places the issue in the context of federal jurisdiction as a whole, 
one sees that the unique and rigorous rule that restrains the federal 
courts from creating judge-made law in diversity cases cannot be 
based on anything as tenuous as residual deference to the sover-
eignty of the states, and that even if it could, the rule could not be 
derived from anything in the Rules of Decision Act. 
(1) 
Although each person has his own favorite phrase, everyone es-
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sentially agrees on the standard the Court applies to the formation of 
special federal common law in diversity cases. The Court says that 
the federal courts shall make no judge-made law that "significantly 
affect[s] the result of a litigation" (York), 18 or that "bear[s] substan-
tially on the question whether the litigation would come out one way 
in the federal court and another way in the state court" (Byrd), 19 or 
that would "make . . . a difference to the . . . result of the litiga-
tion" (Hanna).20,, Jeffrey Lehman and I follow the Court in calling 
this the "outcome-determinative" limitation;21 Professor Ely calls it 
the "rejuvenated" outcome-determinative test;22 Professor Redish 
calls it the "modified" outcome-determinative test.23 The essential 
point is that in fashioning special common law in diversity cases, 
federal courts are bound by a "polic[y]"24 against the imposition of 
rules which would cause a litigant to win a suit in federal court that 
he would otherwise lose in state court-absent a (very) strong federal 
policy to the contrary.25 
The dispute concerns the rationale or federal value that underlies 
the outcome-determinative limitation.26 This is not an idle dispute, 
because without understanding the value that informs the limitation, 
one cannot know what the limitation means or how to apply it in 
18. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
19. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958). 
20. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965). For what we mean by "outcome-
determinative," see note 25 i,!fra. 
21. Compare Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 364, with Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 
466 (1965). 
22. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 717 (1974). 
23. Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate 
Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 373 (1977). 
24. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). 
25. Professor Redish says that Jeffrey Lehman and I advocate a "strict" outcome-determi-
native test (as opposed to a "modified" outcome-determinative test). Redish, Continuing the 
Erie Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REV. 959, 966 (1980). But then 
Professor Redish also says that the Supremacy Clause does not apply to federal judges (as 
opposed to state judges). Anyone who wishes to know what Jeffrey Lehman and I actually 
advocate in the way of an outcome limitation may read it for himself. See Westen & Lehman, 
supra note 8, at 373-74, 381-85 & n.216. 
To be sure, while the outcome-determinative limitation is the only common-law limitation 
on the formation of federal judge-made rules of procedure in diversity cases, it is not the sole 
limitation. In addition, federal judges are bound both by the enumeration offederal powers in 
the Constitution and by the requirement in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976), 
that they not abridge "substantive rights." See Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 364-65. 
Hence, in fashioning a federal common law of procedure in diversity cases, federal judges may 
not fashion rules that either affect outcomes within the meaning of York or abridge "substan-
tive rights" within the meaning of the Rules Enabling Act. 
26. Although Professor Redish prefers a "balancing" test to an "outcome-determinative" 
test, he admits that the two tests often produce the same results. Redish & Phillips, supra note 
23, at 384. Thus, the real issue is, not so much the content of that test, but the rationale that 
underlies it. · 
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future cases. We argue that the controlling value is the defeasible 
policy against unfairly discriminating between state court litigants 
and federal court litigants regarding the results of their litigation 
based on their places of citizenship. Professor Redish argues that the 
limitation is based - not on a notion of personal unfairness to indi-
vidual litigants - but on a generalized reluctance to intrude upon 
the authority of the states to make law of their own. 
Professor Redish phrases his tenth-amendment-like argument in 
different ways. He talks about the "interest[] of the state[s] ... in 
having their respective . . . rules apply";27 about the "balance of au-
thority and power within the federal system";28 about the fear of en-
acting federal law that "undermine[s] the attainment of legitimate 
state objectives."29 What it all comes down to, however, is the same 
fear that troubled antebellum judges in the first quarter of the twen-
tieth century: the fear that the federal government will gobble up so 
much of the sphere of governance that there will be nothing left for 
the states to regulate. As he puts it, the relevant concern is the "need 
to preserve a balance between competing state and federal interests 
and policies - in sum, the interest of the federal system."30 
The problem with Professor Redish's generalized invocation of 
"federalism" is not that federalism is immaterial, but that it fails to 
explain both why diversity cases are special, and why the limitation 
on the formation of special federal common law in diversity cases is 
so unyielding.31 We would be the last to deprecate the value of what 
27. Redish, Continuing the Erie lJehate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. 
REV. 959 (1980). 
28. Redish & Phillips, supra note 23, at 380. 
29. Id. at 378. 
30. Id. at 360. 
31. Professor Redish has no answer to this. His only response is a veiled suggestion that 
the reason federal courts are prohibited from creating federal common law in diversity cases is 
that there are no "federal policies" to be "furthered." Redish, supra note 27, at 969. The 
suggestion is not only false, it is unresponsive. If there are no "federal policies" to be fur-
thered, the issue of federal common law never arises: one does not need to pro/1ihit the federal 
courts from making federal law in areas in which they have no plausible reasons for doing so. 
The task of prohibiting the federal courts from forming federal common law arises only where 
there are legitimate (though, perhaps, insufficient) reasons for creating independent federal 
rules of decision. Thus, consider this question: in creating a federal common law of testimo-
nial privileges, should the federal courts also extend it to diversity cases, or should they defer 
to state rules of privilege in diversity cases? It goes without saying that federal courts have a 
legitimate interest in disregarding state privileges - i.e., the ever present interest of courts in 
being able to compel testimony pertinent to the disputes before them. If the federal courts are 
prohibited from applying federal rules of privilege in diversity cases, therefore, it is not be-
cause they have no legitimate interest in applying them, but because their interest is out-
weighed by special and rigorous federal policies that are peculiar to diversity cases. See Feo. 
R. Evm. 501 (federal courts, which have authority to create a federal common law of privi-
leges for nondiversity suits, are prohibited from applying them in diversity suits in the face of 
state rules of privilege to the contrary). 
May 1980] Comment -After "L!fe for Erie " 979 
is disparagingly called "states' rights."32 The American government 
is an effort by people to distribute sovereignty in an uneasy balance 
between the central government and the constituent states, and the 
balance is affected every time the central government asserts its au-
thority to the displacement of the states.33 But the problem of states' 
rights is hardly unique to diversity cases. It is fully implicated when-
ever a federal constitutional command is made binding on the states, 
whenever a constitutional command to the states is broadly con-
strued, whenever new constitutional rights are created vis-a-vis the 
states, whenever the national legislature enacts legislation in areas of 
governance shared by the states, and whenever the federal courts in-
fer federal civil remedies from federal prohibitions, or fashion bodies 
of special federal common law. Indeed, as far as states' rights are 
concerned, each of the foregoing assertions of federal power is far 
more intrusive and traumatic to the "federal system" than any pica-
yune application of federal procedural rules in diversity suits. If the 
central government can be trusted to make such momentous deci-
sions on behalf of the states - and to do so without the need for 
rigorous judicial review or special self-restraint - surely it can be 
trusted to adopt judge-made rules of procedure in diversity cases. 
To put it bluntly, it is inconceivable that a Court that has ren-
dered nearly the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states, that 
imposes extensive obligations on the states through its interpreta-
tions of fourteenth amendment "equality," that imposes new duties 
on the states through its novel determinations of "liberty" and four-
. teenth amendment "due process," that defers to nearly every asser-
tion of national legislative authority, that allows the federal 
government to condition its enormous spending power on con-
forming regulation by the states, that sustains massive delegations of 
32. For an interesting effort to fashion a constitutional doctrine of "states' rights" as a 
bulwark against federal encroachment, see Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549-59 (1975) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The significant thing about Justice Rehnquist's views, however, is 
how rare they are. But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (per Rehn-
quist, J.). 
33. Precisely for this re~on, Jeffrey Lehman and I argued that in deciding between fash-
ioning an independent federal rule of decision on the one hand, or adopting state law by 
reference on the other, the courts should always recognize a species of presumption in favor of 
state law. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 380 n.207. The two most significant things 
that can be said about the presumption, however, are (1) it appears to be rather easily out-
weighed by countervailing federal interests, and (2) it is not peculiar to diversity cases, but 
applies in every assertion of federal jurisdiction. Consequently, if there is an unusually strong 
preference for state law in diversity cases, it must be based on something other than the gener-
alized and ever-present preference for "adopt[ing] the ready-made body of state law as the 
federal rule of decision until Congress strikes a different accommodation." United States v. 
Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 {1979) (footnote omitted). For what that "something" 
is, see notes 35-38, i,!fra. 
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national lawmaking authority to federal administrative agencies, 
that engages in expansive interpretations of federal regulatory stat-
utes, and that creates extensive areas of special federal common law 
- all while scarcely mentioning their effect on continued gover-
nances by the states - could simultaneously wring its hands over the 
employment of federal procedures that might affect the outcome of 
diversity suits.34 If the Court is serious about exercising special re-
straints in diversity cases (and it clearly is), it must be concerned 
with some principle of justice peculiar to diversity cases - some per-
sonal claim of right more acute than a residual plea for states' rights. 
The answer is not hard to find. It appears in every major opinion 
by the Court since Erie, and in Erie itself; the limitation on the crea-
tion of special federal common law of procedure in diversity cases is 
based on an anti-discrimination principle, a principle against un-
fairly discriminating against litigants with respect to the outcome of 
their disputes based on their places of citizenship. That is what Jus-
tice Brandeis meant in condemning Sw!ft for "introduc[ing] grave 
discrimination by non-citizens against citizens" and for rendering 
"equal protection of the law" "impossible" (Erie);35 what Justice 
Frankfurter meant in saying that "the fortuitous stance of residence 
out of State of one of the parties to a litigation ought not give rise to 
a discrimination against others equally concerned but locally resi-
34. Professor Redish responds that the cases beginning with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37 (1971), demonstrate that the Court is capable of wringing its hands over states' rights. In-
deed, Younger and its progeny are intriguing precisely because they do reveal a degree of 
fastidiousness for federalism that is not reflected in the Court's other decisions. But it does not 
follow that one can jump from Younger to Erie because, in fact, the two cases are significantly 
different: the issue of federalism in Younger is not which government (state or federal) has 
authority to enact the applicable rule of decision for a case, but which judges shall hear the 
case in the first instance. This is significant for two reasons: first, it means that in deferring to 
state-court judges in Younger, the Court is not deferring to any abstract interest of the state as 
a whole in being able to make law, but is empathizing with the personal embarrassment that 
any judge feels when a higher authority interrupts a proceeding he has already commenced to 
adjudicate and drives him from the bench. Second, it means that in deferring to state-court 
judges in Younger, the Court is not foregoing federal authority to enact the applicable rule of 
decision, or foregoing the opportunity to review the application of federal rules to the case at 
hand, but is merely postponing its review until after the state court has had an opportunity to 
give effect to federal law. Hence, given these distinctions, the Court's deference to federalism 
in Younger does not explain its very different and rigorous insistence that the federal courts be 
prohibited altogether from making judge-made law in diversity cases. 
35. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938) (emphasis added). Needless to 
say, in speaking of "equal protection," Justice Brandeis was not referring to the fourteenth 
amendment (which, then, applied only to the states) or to any other constitutional limitation. 
The constitutional proplem referred to in Erie was the practice of fashioning federal judge-
made law in areas in which the federal government as a whole has no competence to govern, 
See Friendly, supra note 13. The "discrimination" in the application of federal judge-made 
law was a separate issue in Erie and was condemned, not because it was unconstitutional, but 
because it violated the federal common-law policy against causing litigants to lose suits in state 
court that they would have won in federal court, solely because of their place of citizenship. 
See Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 371 n.181. See also note 14 supra. 
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dent" (York);36 what Chief Justice Warren meant in saying that it is 
"unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ 
because the suit ha(s] been brought in a federal court";37 what the 
Court meant this year in calling it "'inequitable'" for a federal di-
versity suit to come out differently than it would in state court 
"solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship 
between the litigants."38 
The foregoing anti-discrimination "polic[y]"39 is not constitution-
ally mandated, nor is it absolute. But it is sufficiently strong that the 
federal courts ought not to depart from it, except in response to a 
legislative directive or to a federal policy so strong that the legisla-
ture could reasonably be expected to deem it dominant. 
The difference between Professor Redish's notion of states' rights 
and Justice Brandeis's notion of "discrimination" can be illustrated 
by Congress's response to the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Congress codified existing practice by authorizing th~ federal courts 
to continue to fashion a "common law" of evidentiary privileges 
based on judicial interpretations of "reason and experience";40 yet, at 
the same time, Congress also codified existing practice by prohibit-
ing the federal courts from applying such privileges in diversity 
suits.41 What is the federal policy that explains the distinction? Why 
should Congress be willing to displace state rules of privilege in 
every area of life touched by federal jurisdiction and, yet, refrain 
from doing so in diversity suits? The distinction cannot be based on 
any generalized deference to state law, because if Congress were so-
licitous of state law, it would prohibit federal rules of privilege alto-
gether. Nor can it be based on any incremental impact on state-
created relationships of confidentiality that results from displacing 
state law in diversity suits, because once the federal government in-
trudes at all upon the imparting of confidences, the damage is al-
ready done.42 Rather, the distinction must be based, not on a respect 
36. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945)(emphasis added). 
37. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (emphasis added). 
38. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 100 S. Ct. 1978, 1986 (1980) (emphasis added) (citing 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)). 
39. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). 
40. FED. R. Evm. 501. 
41. Id. 
42. Since-state-created testimonial privileges are designed to encourage communication by 
guaranteeing the communicants confidentiality, the impact of the privilege is felt at the time 
the communication is made. At the time they engage in communication, people do not know 
whether they will eventually end up in court, or, if so, whether they will end up in state court 
or federal court, or, ifin federal court, whether they will be involved in a federal-question suit 
or a diversity suit. The only significant issue at the time of their communication is whether 
there is a significant risk that some court in some suit will force the communication to be 
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for state law (which Congress is willing to displace), but on a con-
cern for individual litigants: a belief that it is "inequitable"43 for the 
outcome of litigation to depend upon the citizenship of the parties. 
(2) 
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of 
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall 
he regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply. 
Rules of .Decision Act44 
Professor Redish also disputes the source of the limitation on the 
application of federal judge-made rules in diversity cases. He does 
not believe (as Jeffrey Lehman and I believe) that the limitation is a 
judge-made or judge-acknowledged policy governing the creation of 
special federal common law of procedure in diversity cases. He be-
lieves, instead, that the limitation has a specific statutory source in 
the Rules of Decision Act. 
We shall not dwell upon the facts that (a) the Rules of Decision 
Act does not speak to diversity cases, but extends to all federal "civil 
actions"; (b) the Rules of Decision Act says nothing at all about any 
limitations on judge-made rules or federal common law; (c) the 
Supreme Court has held that the Rules of Decision Act contains no 
limitations on the authority of the federal government to make law, 
but is merely a truism of the relationships between federal law and 
state law that would otherwise exist in its absence;45 and ( d) the 
Supreme Court has held the outcome-determinative limitation to be 
binding even in diversity cases where the Rules of Decision Act does 
n,ot apply.46 These objections are set forth at length in our article.47 
disclosed. Consequently, once federal courts are allowed to disregard state-created privileges 
in any significant number of suits, the damage to state-created relationships of confidentiality 
is already done. 
43. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
44. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1976). 
45. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945). Professor Redish complains 
that this renders the Rules of Decision Act a "nullity." Redish, supra note 27, at 967-68 n.60. 
If so, he should direct his criticism at the Supreme Court because it has been saying for over 
150 years that the Rules of Decision Act is nothing but a truism. Compare Guaranty Trust Co. 
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945) (the Rules of Decision Act is "merely declaratory of what 
would in any event have governed the federal courts"), with Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 464 (1831) (the Rules of Decision Act "has been uniformly held to be no 
more than a declaration of what the law would have been without it"). Accord, Bank of Ham-
ilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 525 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.). 
46. Until it was amended in 1948, the Rules of Decision Act applied only in "trials at 
common law,'' and not in suits in equity. See Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940). Yet 
the outcome-determinative limitation was nonetheless held applicable in suits in equity. See 
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Professor Redish's present thesis, that it is the Rules of Decision 
Act that prohibits the federal courts from adopting certain kinds of 
judge-made rules of procedure in diversity cases, is based on a nega-
tive inference from the Act: the Rules of Decision Act directs the 
federal courts to apply state law, except where certain varieties of 
federal law provide otherwise; in enumerating the variety of super-
seding federal law, the Act mentions only three - the Constitution, 
treaties of the United States, and Acts of Congress; it says nothing 
about federal common law or other species of judge-made law; 
hence (so the argument goes), by omitting any reference to the fed-
eral common law, the Rules of Decision Act implies that the federal 
courts shall not apply federal coinmon law in the face of state law to 
the contrary. In other words, Professor Redish argues that the Rules 
of Decision Act, by negative implication, prohibits the federal courts 
from fashioning federal common law in any area in which state law 
exists to the contrary. 
There are obvious problems with Professor Redish's hypothesis. 
First, if the Rules of Decision Act truly prohibits the federal courts 
from fashioning federal common law, the prohibition applies the Act 
not only in diversity cases, but in al! "civil actions." Yet on the same 
day he delivered his opinion in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, Justice Bran-
deis also wrote for a unanimous Court in Hinderlider v. LaP!ata 
River Co.,48 holding that the federal courts do have legitimate au-
thority to fashion federal common law. The federal courts have not 
only exercised such authority ever since, in areas now too numerous 
to count, but have done so for a very good reason: because the very 
silence on the part of Congress in areas that call for uniform federal 
regulation implies authority in the federal courts to fashion judge-
made law in the first instance, subject to oversight by the legisla-
ture.49 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 
202, 205 (1938). 
41. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 365-73. 
48. 304 U.S. 92, I 10 (1938). 
49. People sometimes ask: where do federal courts get the conslilutional authority to create 
federal common law? Perhaps the best way to answer is to put the counter-question: where do 
federal courts now get the constitutional authority to interpret federal statutes? 
The answer to each question is the same because the questions themselves are the same. 
The federal courts derive their authority to fashion federal common law from the same consti-
tutional source as their authority to interpret statutes because they are doing essentially the 
same thing in each case: making law in areas oflegislative silence, on the assumption that the 
legislature would wish them to do so. 
But wait, people might ask: what if the legislature does not want the courts to create fed-
eral common law? Again, the answer is the same as with statutory interpretation: if the fed-
eral courts conclude that Congress does not desire them to form federal common law, they 
should respond in the same way they would in interpreting a statute under the circumstances 
984 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:971 
Second, even if the Rules of Decision Act is somehow construed 
to prohibit federal common law solely in diversity cases, the con-
struction conflicts with irrefutable authority to the effect that the fed-
eral courts may create federal common law in diversity cases. Thus, 
to take a noted example, the Court held in .Banco Naciona/ de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino50 that the federal courts have authority to fashion a fed-
eral common law regarding "acts of state" and to apply it as fully in 
diversity suits as in other assertions of federal jurisdiction. Similarly, 
in Howard v. Lyons51 the Court held that it had authority to create a 
federal common law of official immunity for federal officials, and to 
apply it in all pertinent cases, including cases arising in diversity. To 
say that the Rules of Decision Act prohibits the formation of federal 
common law in diversity cases not only means that Sabbatino and 
Lyons were wrongly decided, but that the legitimate federal pur-
poses such law serves must go unfulfilled in diversity cases. 
Third, even if the Rules of Decision Act is somehow construed as 
solely a prohibition on the formation of a federal common law of 
procedure in diversity cases, it still goes too far, because the prohibi-
tion would invalidate all judge-made rules of procedure, regardless 
of whether they were outcome-determinative or not. Yet Professor 
Redish himself believes that the federal courts do have authority 
under the Rules of Decision Act to adopt some judge-made rules of 
procedure in diversity cases, viz., rules designed to further federal 
interests that "outweigh,"52 or "outbalance,"53 the state interests un-
derlying the state rules to the contrary.54 Hence, in order to force the 
- by abstaining from forming a federal rule of decision. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 333 
U.S. 483 (1948) (abstaining from construing the penalty provisions of an ambiguous statute, on 
the ground that Congress would not wish the Court to engage in guesswork). Hence, the for-
mation of federal common law presupposes that the legislature would desire it to be formed. 
As for the actual source of the federaljudiciary's authority to fashion federal common law, 
it (like the cognate authority to interpret federal statutes) can be attributed either to a delega• 
tion from the legislature or to a direct delegation from Article III. Thus, one can argue that 
Congress implicitly authorizes the courts to make law by remaining silent in areas that call for 
uniform federal regulation. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 
U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (Congress's grant of jurisdiction to the courts "authorizes federal courts to 
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of. . . collective bargaining agreements"). 
Alternatively, one can argue that Article III gives the courts power to make law wherever 
Congress remains silent in an area calling for uniform federal regulation. Ultimately, it makes 
no difference which conception one adopts. The important thing is to know (a) when Congress 
has been silent, and (b) whether an area calls for uniform federal regulation. 
50. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
51. 360 U.S. 593 (1959). 
52. Redish & Phillips, supra note 23, at 399. · 
53. Id. at 398. 
54. Id. at 391-92, 397-98. Notice the significance of this concession. Professor Redish con• 
cedes that the federal courts have authority under the Rules of Decision Act to fashion a 
common law of procedure in diversity cases whenever the federal interest in doing so out• 
weighs the federal interest in applying state law by reference; he also concedes that federal 
May 1980) Comment -After "L!fe for Erie " 985 
outcome-determinative limitation into the language of the Rules of 
Decision Act one must make the following assumptions: (a) that by 
omitting any reference to "federal common law," the Rules of Deci-
sion Act implicitly prohibits the federal courts from applying it in 
the face of state law to the contrary; (b) that despite its reference to 
all "civil actions," the Rules of Decision Act should be construed to 
apply only to diversity suits; ( c) that despite its complete omission of 
any reference to "federal common law," the Rules of Decision ~ct 
should be construed to prohibit only federal common-law procedure 
in diversity cases; and ( d) that despite its now implicit prohibition on 
judge-made rules of procedure, the Rules of Decision Act should be 
further construed to prohibit only certain judge-made rules of proce-
dure in diversity cases. 
The alternatives should now be clear. One can conclude (as Jef-
frey Lehman and I do) that the federal courts do have authority to 
create special areas of the federal common law; that in doing so, they 
balance the federal need for uniform nationwide rules against the 
value of adopting state law by reference; that one of the "policies"55 
that governs the adoption of state rules in diversity cases is to insure 
that diversity suits come out no differently in federal court than they 
would in state courts "a block away"56 - in sum, that the outcome-
determinative limitation is a judge-made policy that guides the 
courts in their formation of federal common law and, hence, is itself 
an aspect, or rule, of federal common law. 
The foregoing conclusion, that the outcome-determinative limita-
tion has its source in federal common law, is entirely consistent with 
the Rules of Decision Act. It simply means that the varieties of fed-
eral law enumerated in the Rules of Decision Act are not exclusive, 
courts have separate authority under the Rules of Decision Act to create different bodies of 
federal common law in nondiversity cases - different because the considerations being 
"weighed" are different in nondiversity cases and hence, so too is the resulting "balance." Yet 
where does a federal court look for the considerations to be placed in these various "bal-
ances''? And where does it find authority on how much weight to give the various considera-
tions? Obviously not in the Rules of Decision Act because, by Professor Redish's own 
concession, the Rules of Decision Act does not itself itemize the considerations or tell the 
federal courts how much weight to give them in the many diversity and nondiversity cases in 
which they may arise. The only thing the Act does is to instruct the federal courts to give 
whatever considerations may be appropriate whatever weight the considerations may deserve. 
Yet that is precisely what Jejfrey Lehman and I have been saying all along. Thus, Professor 
Redish implicitly concedes what we have been asserting from the outset, viz., that while the 
Rules of Decision Act authorizes the federal courts to create areas of special federal common 
law in diversity and nondiversity cases, alike, the Act does not itself enumerate the standards 
for determining what those many bodies of law shall be: rather, it incorporates by reference 
whatever standards otherwise exist. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 368-69. 
55. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). 
56. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
986 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:971 
and that in addition to the "Constitution," "treaties of the United 
States," and "Acts of Congress," the Act implicitly includes "federal 
common law." It is perfectly reasonable to read the latter term into 
the Act, because, in the last analysis, federal common law shades 
into judicial interpretation of "Acts of Congress" as points do on a 
spectrum.57 Thus, the Supremacy Clause (which refers to the "Con-
stitution," "treaties," and "laws of the United States") is understood 
implicitly to include federal common law;58 so, too Article III (which 
confers jurisdiction over cases arising under the "Constitution," 
57. Professor Redish finds this point "incomprehensible," so perhaps we should spell it 
out. To say that a great oak tree differs from an acorn as a matter of degree does not mean one 
cannot distinguish between the two. It depends entirely upon one's purposes in making the 
distinction. For purposes of gathering wood, one would draw a line between them because as 
an acorn grows into an oak tree, it undergoes innumerable and continuous changes that to• 
gether add up to something significantly different with respect to wood content. For purposes 
of genetic testing, one would not draw a line, because as an acorn grows into an oak tree, it 
does not undergo any changes with respect to its genetic makeup. The latter is what one 
means by saying that the two differ only in degree. 
The same is true, too, of the difference between federal common law and federal statutory 
interpretation. To say that they differ from one another in degree, and the one shades into the 
other as points on a spectrum, means that they are simultaneously both the same and different; 
that is, they are the same as each other in some respects, and different in others. Whether one 
can draw a line between them thus depends upon whether the differences between them are 
sign!ficanl with respect to one's purpose in drawing the line. Jeffrey Lehman and I, ourselves, 
distinguish between the statutory test that governs judicial promulgation of Rules of Civil 
Procedure (i.e., that they not abridge "substantive rights") and the common-law test that gov• 
erns the adoption of judge-made rules of procedure in diversity cases (i.e., that in addition to 
not abridging "substantive rights," they also not be "outcome-determinative"). What justifies 
the line, and explains its placement, is its underlying purpose - namely, that the federal courts 
not apply a federal rule that causes diversity cases to come out differently than they would in 
state court, except in the presence of very strong evidence that the legislature would ratify the 
rule. By that standard, Rules of Civil Procedure are different from other judge-made rules 
because the distinct mechanism for their adoption provides the degree of legislative oversight 
that is necessary to legitimate the adoption of outcome-determinative rules of procedure in 
diversity cases. 
To say that federal statutory interpretation can be distinguished from federal common law 
for the foregoing purpose, however, does not mean that the two can be distinguished for pur• 
poses of supremacy. It depends, again, upon the purpose underlying the principle of 
supremacy. That is, it depends upon whether the differences between federal statutory inter• 
pretation and federal common law are significant for purposes of supremacy. If (as we be-
lieve) the controlling purpose is to permit the federal government to displace state law with 
federal law whenever a legitimate institution of the federal government - whether legislative, 
executive, judicial, or administrative - makes law that is both constitutional and subject to 
legislative oversight, there is no reason at all to distinguish between the two; because for t/1al 
purpose, there are no differences between statutory interpretation and federal common law. 
That, again, is what it means to say that they differ only in degree. 
58. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738-42 (1961); Romero v. International 
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 378 & n.49 (1959); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-11 
(1953); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 
244 U.S. 205, 215-18 (1917). See also Friendly, supra note 13 at 405; Hill, The Law-Making 
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1073-79 
(1967); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1514 (1969). Bui cf. Hart. 
The Relations Between Stale and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 500 (1954) (the com• 
mon law as state law). 
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"treaties," and "laws of the United States");59 the general federal 
question statute (which confers jurisdiction over cases arising under 
the "Constitution," "treaties," and "laws of the United States");60 
and the certiorari statute (which confers jurisdiction on the Supreme 
Court to review claims under the "Constitution," "any treaty," or 
any "statute" of the United States).61 If that were not enough, the 
Court has now firmly held that the explicit enumeration of federal 
law in the Rules of Decision Act is not exclusive, but implicitly in-
cludes "federal common law."62 
59. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (implicitly holding "'federal 
common law'" to be included in the "arising under" provisions of Article III). See generally 
Comment, Federal Common Law and Article IIL· A Jurisdictional Approach To Erie, 74 YALE 
LJ. 325, 331 (1964). 
60. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-101 (1972) ("federal common law" is 
implicitly included within the forms of federal law enumerated in the "arising under" provi-
sions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331). See generally Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 817, 831 (1960); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the 
.District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 165 (1953). 
Indeed, even if Congress originally intended the Rules of Decision Act as a prohibition on 
the federal courts from creating federal common law, Congress must have implicitly repealed 
the prohibition when it later enacted the federal question statute in 1875 (now 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331), because it would be absurd to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear cases 
"arising under" a federal common law that the federal courts had no authority to fashion in 
the first place! 
61. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 937 (1925), now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976) 
(emphasis added). See Hinderlider v. La Plata River Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (the certio-
rari statute, which confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to review claims under the "Con-
stitution," any "treaty," or "statute" of the United States, implicitly includes "federal common 
law"). 
Hinderlider should be of special interest to Professor Redish because, unlike the Supremacy 
Clause, Article III, and the federal-question statute (wllich all refer to "laws"), the certiorari 
statute refers to "statutes"; yet the Hinderlider Court held that the certiorari statute, too, should 
be read implicitly to include claims under "federal common law." 
To be sure, having concluded that the case was based on "federal common law" of inter-
state water apportionment, the Hinder/ider Court also said that the case presented a "claim" 
• under "the Constitution" within the meaning of the certiorari statute. 304 U.S. at 110. But the 
Court surely did not mean to contrast the "Constitution" with "federal common law" because 
that would mean taking the entire existing law of interstate water apportionment and trans-
forming it from "federal common law'' into a class of constitutional law. Rather, by referring 
to a claim under "the Constitution,'' the Hinderlider Court must have meant a claim of "fed-
eral common law" that, in tum, was authorized by the Constitution. See Moore, Federalism 
and Foreign Affairs, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 278-80. 
62. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591-93 (1973) (federal 
"common law" is implicitly included within the forms of federal law explicitly enumerated in 
the Rules of Decision Act). For predecessor opinions, see Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal 
Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 709 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (federal common law is federal law 
within the meaning of the Rules of Decision Act); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 
447, 465-71 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring). See also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 
598 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting): 
[The Rules of Decision] Act provides that state law is to govern a civil trial in a federal 
court "except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress 
otherwise require or provide." The exception has not been interpreted in a crabbed or 
wooden fashion, but, instead, has been used to give expression to important federal inter-
ests. Thus, for example, the exception has been used to apply a federal common law of 
labor contracts in suits under§ 30l(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act [of] 1947; 
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Alternatively, one can go the way of Professor Redish. One can 
assume that despite its language, despite its history, despite its uni-
form interpretation by the courts, the Rules of Decision Act has all 
along contained a secret and silent proviso (below in italics). The 
alternatives are these: 
to apply federal common law to transactions in commercial paper issued by the United 
States where the United States is a party; and to avoid application of governing state law 
to the reservation of mineral rights in a land acquisition agreement to which the United 
States was a party and that bore heavily upon a federal wildlife regulatory program. 
(Emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
To be sure, there was also a statute involved in Li/lie Lake Misere, viz., the Migratory Bird 
Conservation Act. But the presence of a statute does not preclude a case from being based on 
federal common law. If it did, there could never be federal common law because there is 
always a statute somewhere in the background. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, al 336 
n.80. All common law - state as well as federal - takes its shape from the legal norms as a 
whole of the society in which it operates, including statutory norms. Hence, the real question 
is not whether supporting statutes exist, but whether the statutory norms are sufficiently spe• 
cific to enable a court to say that its resulting decision is truly an interpretation of the statute. If 
the supporting statute is too vague or uncertain or removed to give the court any real guidance 
in fashioning a rule of decision, the resulting rule is one of "federal common law" - because 
that is what federal common law means. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 331-36, 375-
76. By that measure Lill/e Lake Misere was based on federal common law because, with re-
spect to the issue in dispute, "no provision of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act guide[d)" 
the Court. Since the Act "fail[ed] to specify whether or to what extent it contemplates dis-
placement of state law," (412 U.S. at 592-93 n.10), the Court was "'require[d] ... to declare, 
as a molter of common law or ''.judicial legislation," rules which may be necessary to .•. 
effectuate the statutory patterns enacted in the large by Congress'" (412 U.S. at 593) (emphasis 
added). 
To all this, Professor Redish's only answer is that by referring to "Acts of Congress" (as 
opposed to "laws"), the Rules of Decision Act is "linguistically [in/capable'' of encompassing 
federal common law. Redish, supra note 27, at 964 (emphasis added). There are two problems 
with Professor Redish's response. For one thing, even if he were right about the nature of the 
"linguistic" issue, his conclusion would be questionable, because it rests on the peculiar as• 
sumption that words have single meanings and, thus, can be understood as independent enti-
ties, without any reference to the purposes with which they were uttered. We wonder what he 
would say about the constitutional command, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). Would he say that the first 
amendment is confined to denials of free speech by the Congress and is "linguistically incapa-
ble" of extending to identical denials by the executive and judicial branches of government? 
Or would he say that the term "Congress" must be construed more broadly to achieve its 
intended purposes? If the latter, then what objection does he have left to the suggestion that 
the term "Acts of Congress" in the Rules of Decision Act be broadly construed to include 
federal common law? 
The more serious problem is that Professor Redish begs the very question at issue: he 
assumes that the "linguistic" question is to decide whether federal common law is an "Act of 
Congress" within the meaning of the Rules of Decision Act. That is not the question al all. 
The question is not whether "Acts of Congress" should be deemed to include federal common 
law, but whether the explicit enumeration of federal law in the Rules of Decision Act is exclu-
sive-a question on which the Rules of Decision Act is entirely silent. Being silent, the Act is 
incapable of providing a "linguistic" answer to the question. That is to say, since the real 
question is whether or not the Rules of Decision Act's enumeration of federal laws is exclusive, 
and since that is a question that the Rules of Decision Act does not address, the solution 
cannot be found in the language of the Act. Rather, it must be found in the policies underly-
ing the Act-all of which point toward including federal common law. 
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(Our Version of the Rules of De-
cision Act) 
The laws of the several states, ex-
cept where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or 
Acts of Congress or federal com-
mon law otherwise require or 
provide, shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in civil actions 
in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply. 
(Professor Redish's Version of 
the Act) 
The laws of the several states, ex-
cept where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or 
Acts of Congress or federal com-
mon law otherwise require or 
provide, shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in civil actions 
in the courts of the United 
States, in case~ where they apply. 
Provided, however, that the fed-
eral courts shall not fashion or ap-
ply any federal common law of 
procedure in diversity cases in the 
face of state rules to the contrary, 
unless the federal interests fur-
thered by such judge-made rules 
outweigh the state interests under-
lying the state rules to the con-
trary. 63 
The choice is yours to make. As for ourselves, we can think of 
only one reason why Professor Redish would strain to maintain a 
toe-hold on the Rules of Decision Act: because he committed him-
self to it three years ago and now feels he must defend it, at all costs. 
63. For the extent to which this proviso, properly understood, works to undermine the very 
thesis Professor Redish wishes to advance, see note 54 supra. 
